argued before the Court of Criminal Appeal, and that Court has never affirmed them on their merits. They have always been taken for granted as authoritative and binding, and the only question for argument has been whether they have been modified by subsequent judicial decisions. To this day, then, the Rules remain untested by argument.
(2) All this is bad enough, but it was left to the Puckish ingenuity of Mercier to point out what nobody had previously noticed, viz., that the questions set by the House of Lords were not the questions that the judges answered. The judges did not like the House of Lords' questions, which they could not answer, so they substituted another set of their own devising which they thought they could. Like the fabled undergraduate, " Far be it from us," they said, " to disparage the minor prophets, but in our opinion greater interest attaches to the kings of Israel, who were as follows."
Well, the kings of Israel have been with us for eighty years in undisturbed possession, so I suppose they must now be allowed a good title. I only mention these circumstances in order to emphasize the fact that the McNaughton Rules began as squatters and it is no use pretending, as some lawyers do, that they are an old landed family. But the fact remains that the Rules are now undoubted law. They may have become so by mistake, but communis error facit jus, and there is an end of it. The question is whether the law ought to be altered.
The initial objection to any interference with the McNaughton Rules is on the score of the necessity of authority. The argument runs thus: Granted that the Rules are as bad as they are said to be, granted even that they are unjust in their operation, still they are certain; and is it not generally agreed that certainty in law is even more important than justice ? And even from the point of view of justice is rough justice not better than no justice at all ? The whole conception of responsibility involves difficult, subtle, obscure considerations. Once you step aside from the sure footpath afforded by the McNaughton Rules, you will find yourself floundering in a metaphysical bog from which there is no escape. Anything is better than that. This argument is plausible, but it involves several assumptions. It assumes, first, that responsibility is necessarily and exclusively a question of law, which is a petitto principii, for responsibility is quite capable of being treated as a question of fact. Secondly, it assumes that the McNaughton Rules secure certainty, a point on which many of us are not at all satisfled. The third assumption-and the only one with which I am for the moment concerned -is that without some more or less arbitrary guide like the McNaughton Rules one is bound to get into a hopeless muddle. The long-drawn and barren debates between lawyers and medical men do lend support to the idea; but when you come to look at them they prove no more than that the topic lends itself to irrelevance. I may be wrong, but my own conclusion is that the question is a comparatively simple one. Its apparent difficulty arises from the fact that there are two false steps that one may take almost at the outset. Let me indicate them briefly.
First, there is the error that is embodied in the vulgar saying, " Everybody is a little bit mad," or " Nobody is perfectly sane." From one point of view it would be difficult to conceive a sillier remark. Strictly speaking it means nothing; and I imagine that that sorely-tried man, the alienist, must feel his own mental stability imperilled when he is assured-as he is every daythat it must be true because " he himself has said it," though the question whether it is to his credit is left in some doubt. What the alienist has said of course is that " insanity " is a relative term, which is quite true. This is taken to be the same thing as saying that it is just a question of degree, in which case where is the line to be drawn ? How many grains of corn make a heap, &c. ? People who argue in this fashion imagine that reality can be reduced to a dialectic process. But, apart from that, the proposition is inaccurate. To say that a thing is " relative " is not exactly the same as saying that it is a question of degree. The latter implies an abstract measurement; the former points to a practical end-relative to what ? In the case of sanity and insanity, the latter implies that there exists somewhere an archetype-a Platonic idea of the sane man of which we mortals are more or less imperfect copies. But such metaphysical flights are not part of the alienist's business. He takes no stock of Platonic absolutes. He regards only his general experience of mankind, and it is enough for him that, relative to that experience, the condition of a patient who is suffering from general paralysis of the insane requires a lunacy certificate.
The second error that besets the question of criminal responsibility is similar to the first, and indeed is often combined with it. How, it is asked, can one define the criminal responsibility of the insane without inquiring into the concept of responsibility in general, -which is a matter without conclusion ? Scientific investigation, it is argued, leads to an impasse, for science is bound to be determinist, and determinism means that .there is no such thing as responsibility. The saint -and the sinner, the ascetic and the voluptuary, the patriot and the traitor, the sane man and the lunatic all act as creatures of cause and effect. How then can you praise one and punish the other? Why punish anybody? This is supposed to be a reductio ad absurdum, and so it would be if only the reasoning were correct. But why should a just statement of criminal responsibility involve a roving commission over the whole field of etbics. If there is one thing clear about social punishment it is that it is awarded in accordance with the ethical standards that prevail from time to time. At one time all criminals, sane or insane, may be punished indiscriminately; at another time unsoundness of mind may be regarded to a greater or less extent as an excuse. There is no eternal and absolute standard; and the notion that a just law of the criminal responsibility of the insane cannot be framed without a solution of the final problems of ethics is quite irrelevant.
Ethical theory has nothing to do with the case. Criminal responsibility, it is true, does involve ethical considerations, but they are strictly practical. The question we have to answer is: Do the McNaughton Rules, according to our standards, do justice to insane persons charged with crime; and, if not, how is such justice to be secured ? In this connexion I cannot do better than quote the words of Mercier. After defining the term "responsible " as "rightly liable to punishment," he proceeds:-"By rightly liable to punishment I mean liable to punishment on grounds that appear fair and just to the ordinary man when they are explained to himgrounds that commend themselves as equitable and right, not to the faddist, the pedant, or the enthusiast, but to the common sense of the common man of this time and this country."
These are wise words. You will notice the emphasis placed on c the common man" and likewise the qualifications of the term. The common man is to have the grounds explained to him, and he is not an abstract common man," but "the common man of this time and country." Having gone so far, it is curious that Mercier did not take the step that by logical necessity follows, viz., to deny the possibility of legal rules for the determination of a lunatic's criminal responsibility and to declare boldly that the question is one for the unfettered decision of a jury. This step was in fact taken last year by the Medico-Psychological Association in the memorandum which they submitted to Lord Justice Atkin's Committee. That memorandum is a document not only of great interest but of permanent value; and although its argument was not accepted by Atkin, L. J., and his colleagues, I venture to say, with all respect, that it has not been answered. I cannot deal with it in detail, but its conclusion can be stated in a single sentence, viz., "No man should be liable to punishment for a criminal act committed during and by reason of insanity; and if it be proved that the act was committed during insanity there is a presumption, which it is for the prosecution to rebut, that it was committed by reason of insanity." To put it in another way: The jury should be directed that where they are satisfied that the prisoner was insane they must not convict unless the prosecution have satisfied them that the insanity had nothing to do with the crime.
There is nothing, to my mind, very startling in such a proposal. It is simple, straightforward and just. But the Atkin Committee have detected a fatal flaw in it. "It is all very well," they say, but if your proposal were adopted, how on earth are we ever to get juries to convict lunatics ? " That in substance is what they say. If you do not believe me, read the Atkin Committee's Report. You will'agree, I think, that it carries its own refutation on the face of it, so I do not propose to waste your time by discussing it further.
My own view, as you may have gathered, coincides generally with that of the Medico-Psychological Association. I have approached the matter from the lawyer's standpoint. I have given it long and anxious thought, and my conclusion is that the McNaughton Rules and all rules on the same model are juristically bad-that they are useless, anomalous and calculated to defeat the ends of justice. I am bound to admit, however, that I am in a minority. The great mass of lawyers insist that rules of the kind are necessary, and some doctors are prepared to agree with them. No one regards the McNaughton Rules as perfect, but it is said that in principle they are sound, and with a little tinkering they might be made to pass. The bit of tinkering that is in favour at the moment is an addition to the rules to the effect that it should be a good defence to show that the accused was by reason of mental disease irresistibly impelled to commit the act with which he is charged. This notion was first suggested by Stephen as a gloss upon the McNaughton Rules; but Stephen himself would not vouch for its legitimacy, and it has since been rejected by the Courts. The British Medical Association, however, have put it forward as the only possible and acceptable amendment. It has been approved by the Atkin Committee, and within the last few weeks it has been included in' Lord Darling's Criminal Responsibility (Trials) Bill, which generally embodies the substance of the Atkin Committee's recommendations. Now let me say at once that this doctrine of " irresistible impulse" has achieved a larger measure of agreement between lawyers and doctors than anything else in the vexed question of criminal responsibility; and what these lawyers and doctors are agreed upon is this-that it is utterly meaningless and impracticable, and the sooner it passes into the limbo of vain imaginings the better for everybody. I am not qualified to explore its medical absurdities, but I ask leave to quote some words that I wrote two years ago, which I think are to the point. I leave you to correct the errors and supply the omissions. Section of Psychiatry 5 "Certain insanities (such as epileptic insanity and some conditions of puerperal mania) are characterized by a high degree of impulsive action, usually suicidal and sometimes homicidal also; but where there is a very high degree of impulsive action, it is difficult to say that the patient knows wbat he is doing, and consequently such cases are generally capable of being brought within the scope of the McNaughton Rules. I write subject to correction, but so far as my own observation goes, the cases in which the defence of 'irresistible impulse' is set up are seldom, if ever, cases of true 'impulsive insanity.' Usually there is ample evidence of deliberation. The defence, relying on the popular psychology of action, can think of nothing better to suggest than that the culprit was irresistibly impelled to commit the criminal act, but as all the circumstances negative any such idea, the jury, very naturally and properly, refuse to accept an explanation that insults their intelligence." 1 In the foregoing citation I make no mention of obsessional states. These are often relied upon as hard cases under the existing law. Even Maudsley makes much of them, and thereby, I think, weakens his case. Obsessions, as we all know, can be and are resisted and controlled bv the patient, and it is an abuse of language to talk of them as constituting "irresistible" impulses. Powerful they may be, and a man may yield to them, which simply means, not that they are irresistible, but that they have not been resisted. So far from being a reason for exempting from punishment, mere obsessions are a powerful argument for penal sanctions. The soldier going into action has an impulse to run away which would be irresistible but for his knowledge that if he yields to it he will be shot. The penalty is ordained for the very reason that without it the impulse would not be resisted. Such is the main legal criticism of the doctrine of irresistible impulse, and it is so conclusive that I feel it unnecessary to enter upon any discussion of the many subsidiary objections which may be urged against it.
In justice to the Atkin Committee it must be said that in proposing to allow the doctrine of "irresistible impulse" they do not contemplate that it would cover any case that is not capable of being brought within the existing law. All they seek to do is to fill out what they describe as " a logical insufficiency " of the McNaughton Rules-in other words it is a mere drafting amendment without practical consequences. Why the waters should be troubled in order to cure a " logical insufficiency " it passes my wit to tell.
There are many more things I might say, but I will conclude by repeating my submission, viz., that the criminal responsibility of a person alleged to be insane cannot justly be determined by means of a set of invariable rules, but is a matter to be decided by a jury in accordance with prevailing normal standards after due consideration of all the relevant facts, including the evidence of medical witnesses, on the general mental condition of the accused. There is no need for "rules." The question of fact for the jury would be a very simple one, viz.: "Are you satisfied, on a fair view of the evidence, that the prisoner's act proceeded from a diseased mind? If so, you will acquit him. If, on the contrary, you think his act proceeded from pure wickedness of mind, you will find him guilty." I can conceive of no question more fit for the decision of a jury. Questions quite as difficult are submitted to juries every day. Are there any rules of law that juries must observe in determining what is fair comment? What is even more to the point (for it involves the very question of unsoundness of mind) is the testamentary capacity-a pure jury matter.
Surely if a jury can be trusted to pronounce on the testamentary capacity of an alleged lunatic they can be trusted to pronounce on the analogous matter of his criminal responsibility. I can see no difference in principle between the two cases.
To those who still have doubts, and who foresee red ruin and the breakiDg up of laws as the inevitable result of the abrogation of the McNaughton Rules, I would say: Read the case of R. v. Shipley-you will find it in State Trials, vol. xxi-and if you have read it before read it again. Some 140 years ago Dr.
Shipley, Dean of St. Asaph, was prosecuted for publishing a seditious libel. He was defended by the great Erskine, then rapidly ascending to the zenith of his fame at the Bar. The law at that time was that it was for the judge and not for the jury to find whether the matter complained of was a libel-i.e., that libel was a question of law-and that all the jury had to find was whether it had been published. Erskine disputed the law, but was overruled, and the Dean* was convicted. Erskine, in a speech which is one of the classics of forensic argument, moved in the King's Bench for a new trial. Here is what Lord Mansfield said in discharging the rule. After stating the law, as it then stood, his Lordship proceeded " In opposition to this, what is contended for ? That the law shall be in every particular cause what any twelve men, who shall happen to be the jury, shall be inclined to think, liable to no review and subject to no control, under all the prejudices. of the popular cry of the day. . . . Under such an administration of law no man could tell, no counsel could advise, whether a paper was or was not punishable. I am glad that I am not bound to subscribe to such an absurdity, such a solecism in politics. Agreeable to the uniform judicial practice since the Revolution, warranted by the fundamental principles of the Constitution, of the trial by jury, and upon the reason and fitness of the thing, we are all of opinion that this motion should be rejected."
And yet, a few years later as a direct result of the Dean of St. Asaph's case, Fox's Libel Act declared this absurdity, this solecism in politics, to be the law of the land; and so it has continued to this day. And here we are to-night all alive and comparatively well. I am almost encouraged to imagine that we might equally well survive the abolition of the Rules in McNaughton's case.
Dr. R. H. COLE
said Lord Justice Atkin's Committee was to some extent hindered by having two separate medical reports, one from the British Medical 'Association and one from the Medico-Psychological Association. In 1896 the feeling against the MeNaughton Rules was very strong, and the Medico-Psychological committee of that date set to work fully intending to advise that they be abrogated. But after giving a good deal of consideration to the matter they decided the rules could not be improved upon. Dr. Maudsley was the first medical man to attack the rules, and Maudsley's point was that at the back of the intellectual faculties of mind were the instinctive and emotional activities, which were largely responsible for criminal acts. If any attempt was to be made to tinker with the McNaughton Rules, he (the speaker) suggested that the question of defective reasoning should be left out, the question being restricted to one of the degree of actual disease of the mind. He personally agreed that the rules should be abolished, and though eventual justice was done to the prisoner, he thought temporary injustice had been done to insane persons who committed criminal acts, in the performance of the ritual of the death sentence attaching to a prisoner condemned on the capital charge, the judge meantime well know-this controversy, nor, indeed, would any other measure on similar lines. It was professedly based upon the recommendations of Lord Justice Atkin's Committee. But what was that Committee's report ? It was nothing more than a contention for the continuance of a contention.
Dr. T. B. HEYSLOP (President) said that insanity was incapable of definition, so also was sanity; attempts to define one or the other revealed a narrow comprehension, as the terms were indefinable, hence there could be no line of demarcation between the two. The same held good with regard to responsibility. Until a definition of responsibility was agreed uponl it could not be said what irresponsibility consisted of. Unfortunately, the questions of insanity and responsibility were intermingled. Doctors were questioned in courts of law as to sanity or insanity, but they were not allowed to express any opinion as to responsibility, yet in that lay the crux of the question. Learned judges, in chargiing the jury, held that it was for them, the jury, to deal with the question of responsibility. All who had had experience of the courts would recognize that as the truth. With regard to the McNaughton ruling, one had often encountered cases in which this ruling had been applied to the criminal who did not come within its provisions at all, and the criminal, having been found guilty, suffered the extreme penalty of the law. He asked what the McNaughton ruling had to say about somnambulism, the dream-state, epileptic automatism, and various types of epilepsy, and he replied that it had nothing whatever to say about them. It was pathetic to sit in court and hear a jury being charged to apply rules which had no bearing whatever on the case; it was quite a frequent occurrence. This early Victorian ruling of 1843 was applied indiscriminately to all and sundry. The ruling should be banished from the courts, and every case treated on its merits, medical witnesses being allowed to give evidence on responsibility, not on insanity alone. This subject could not be dealt with conclusively until Harley Street was recognized on the question of responsibility.
Mr. DONALD CARSWELL, in acknowledging a vote of thanks for his paper, referred to a case which occurred twenty'years ago, involving an obvious miscarriage of justice from the application of the McNaughton Rules. He felt very strongly that these rules ought to be annulled.
